Reform, Recovery, and Growth: Latin America and the Middle East by Arnold Harberger
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Reform, Recovery, and Growth: Latin America and the Middle
East
Volume Author/Editor: Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, eds.
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-15745-4
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/dorn95-1
Conference Date: December 17-18, 1992
Publication Date: January 1995
Chapter Title: Tax Lore for Budding Reformers
Chapter Author: Arnold Harberger
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7660
Chapter pages in book: (p. 291 - 310)9  Tax Lore for Budding Reformers 
Arnold C.  Harberger 
9.1  Introduction 
When I was first invited to this conference, I was told that part of my task 
was to convey some of the insights and knowledge that came from long experi- 
ence with both the theory and practice of public finance. This helps explain 
the title of this paper, and to motivate my serving up such a bouillabaisse. I 
like that  analogy  because  I include  some items  that  are  very  fundamental 
though familiar (hoping to make the soup rich and nourishing), but also some 
more exotic ingredients  (hoping to give it a special flavor and maybe even 
signal the identity of the cook). 
9.2  On Fairness, Compliance, and Corruption 
More and more as I grow older, issues of tax administration and of “fairness” 
intrude on an economic vision  that was for quite a long time dominated by 
considerations of allocative efficiency. I am impressed by the fact that we live 
in societies that are composed of many different kinds of people (I almost said 
“many different groups,” but thought the better of  it), with widely  differing 
objectives, values, and tastes, struggling against different constraints and ob- 
stacles to make their respective  ways  in  life. They are all members  of  the 
broader polities that carry out the taxing and spending roles of  government. 
They all receive benefits from the various governments that serve them, and 
they all recognize that somehow the bill for these services must be paid. Yet 
we know that governments would not get very far trying to finance themselves 
(as do churches, colleges and universities, and independent charitable organi- 
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zations) by voluntary contributions. Thus we come to fees, rates, and taxes- 
all to a greater or lesser degree involuntary contributions. 
Looking around the world, one sees various kinds of  patterns in the design 
and administration of taxes. I would distinguish four main types of relationship 
between taxpayers and their government: (1) those dominated by mockery and 
mischief, (2)  those dominated by arbitrariness and fear, (3) those dominated 
by  corruption, and (4) those dominated by  a sense of  fairness and voluntary 
compliance. 
Type 1 is well represented by the relationship between taxpayers and govern- 
ment that prevailed until quite recently in Argentina and a number of  other 
Latin American countries. It can be caricatured as almost a game between 
taxpayers and the tax authorities. The authorities raise rates, and evasion in- 
creases; they lower rates, and evasion decreases. We will see later that this sort 
of  process occurs everywhere, but I would define type  1 as covering cases 
where it dominates the relations between taxpayers and government. 
I recall working on a tax project in Argentina in the early 1960s, in which it 
fell to me to study what had happened to taxpayer compliance with the income 
tax during the decade of the 1950s. I did so by performing an exercise that is 
quite simple-one  that I recommend to anybody who has access to the relevant 
figures (for any country, in any period). I took the official statistics on income 
tax receipts for 1951, classified by tax bracket. Obviously evasion was already 
going on in that year, and we have no easy way of knowing its extent. But we 
pass over that problem and simply take the level of  195  1  compliance as a base. 
We then move to 1955 (or some other year with the relevant data) and assume 
that the relative distribution of income in the taxpaying brackets did not change 
between these two years. Implementing this assumption, we let Ly  and Uy be 
the lower and upper bounds of the first tax bracket (By)  in year zero (195  1) and 
let Ny be the number of taxpayers declaring income in the first bracket on that 
year. If  prices grew by p  and real per capita income by y between  1951 and 
1955, we expect the counterpart of  in 1955 (time t)  to have a lower bound 
of  Ly(1  + p  + y) and an upper bound of  Uy(1 + p  + y). Similarly, if  the 
relevant population had grown by nit between 195  1 and 1955, we would expect 
the number of people in this bracket to have grown to Ny( 1 + A).  We now look 
in the 1955 tax table to find how  much tax a typical family with income of 
Ly(1  + i, + y) would have to pay (or alternatively look at the 1951 data to find 
out how much a typical family declaring that income actually paid in  1951). 
We  do the same for the income of  Uy(1 + @ + y). Interpolating sensibly, we 
assign a tax between these limits to the Ny(1 + A)  taxpayers whose incomes 
are calculated to be between Ly( 1 + p + y) and Uy(  1 +  p + y). Obviously, the 
top of  the first bracket Uy is the bottom of  the second, so we  can similarly 
assign to N:( 1 + A) taxpayers a tax that is derived from period t incomes lying 
between Uy(1 + p  + y) and U!$1  + p  + y). 
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(1) the distribution of  taxpayers by  income bracket had remained unchanged 
from 1951 and (2) their degree of compliance had remained unchanged. This 
projected tax revenue can then be compared with actual revenue for 1955. As 
I recall the experiment, they found that actual 1955 revenue was barely two- 
thirds of the projected amount. More astounding still was that, when the same 
exercise was repeated for the time span 1955 to 1959, the same thing occurred. 
Thus, by  1959 taxpayers were paying only about four-ninths of the taxes they 
would have paid on the basis of the level of compliance that prevailed in 195  1  !' 
One interpretation looks upon what happened in Argentina in this period as 
a sort of game between the taxpayers and the tax authorities. The taxpayers 
reduce their compliance; the authorities raise the rates; taxpayers respond by 
reducing compliance still further; the authorities raise rates again, and so on. 
Another interpretation simply views the reduction in compliance as the pre- 
dictable result of increases in rates (see section 9.8). 
It is interesting that cases of type 2, tax administration dominated by arbi- 
trariness and fear, tend to come more from the history books than from the 
annals of recent years. To the best of  my knowledge, one finds people in jail 
for tax  evasion most often in the advanced industrial democracies, and least 
often in countries at the lowest income levels. But the advanced industrial de- 
mocracies are examples of type 4. They make great efforts to instill in their 
citizens a sense of the underlying fairness of the tax system and its administra- 
tion, and impose significant restrictions on their tax administrators, for the pre- 
cise purpose of avoiding persecution and harassment of taxpayers by tax col- 
lectors. These safeguards were instituted as much to keep the tax collectors 
honest as to ensure compliance by taxpayers. Otherwise, the system can easily 
deteriorate into one of type 3, dominated by  corruption, where taxpayers are 
content to buy off the collectors but in the process are subject to all sorts of 
capricious threats. 
Modem  tax  administration  is  characterized  by  randomized  audits  and 
checks, with computers doing most of the selecting and with the probability 
of audit increasing with the potential for evasion, as well as with the likelihood 
that the audit will produce additional revenue. Cases are shifted from one in- 
spector to another with some frequency, and the duties of inspectors are also 
changed more frequently than would be justified on strict efficiency grounds. 
All this is done to minimize the temptation to corruption and at the same time 
to standardize and routinize administrative and audit procedures. 
9.3  On Uniform Tariffs 
Uniformity of rates of import duties can be looked upon as an administrative 
device to help guard against corruption, and as a compliance measure to help 
1. This assumes no major change in income distribution. I believe it is correct to make this 
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instill in taxpayers a sense that they are being fairly treated, and (compared 
with most points of  departure of trade liberalization programs) as a measure 
for economic efficiency. I feel that the efficiency motive would likely be domi- 
nant if  one started from a tariff  system that is highly  protective,  highly dis- 
torting, and far from uniform to begin  with. But once one has corrected the 
most blatant disparities in rates, and once one has moved the average rate down 
to, say, the range between 20% and 40%, then the other two arguments take on 
greater weight. I doubt that there is any surer temptation to corruption than the 
power that a customs inspector has to classify a given import good into two or 
more categories, with  substantially different rates. The offense need not be 
blatant; indeed, a careful inspector could so arrange things (by threatening to 
put an item in a higher-rate category and accepting a “tip” for putting it in the 
correct one) that the Treasury loses no money because of his misdeeds. In any 
case, it is easy in such circumstances for inspectors to make sure that some 
duty is being collected in every case in which they succumb to a bribe. Contrast 
this with a uniform tariff; if  it is truly uniform and across the board, there is 
no  room  at  all  for  corruption  that  works  through  classifications.  Outright 
flouting of the law, by letting items pass without paying any duty at all, or by 
falsifying the documents dealing with customs valuation, becomes a virtually 
necessary precondition to corruption, once a uniform rate is in place. 
In a sense it is obvious how tariff uniformity conduces to a sense of fair 
treatment on the part of  taxpayers: nobody can feel he is being  singled out; 
nobody can sense himself the victim of misunderstanding or prejudice. Every- 
body, simply everybody, is treated in the same way. 
But the usefulness of uniformity goes beyond a simple recognition that the 
law, on paper, treats every importer and every import good alike. It also carries 
the implication that the rate of effective protection facing all actual and poten- 
tial import-competing industries is the same. This in turn (so long as the policy 
has credibility for the future) seems to reassure potential investors in such in- 
dustries that they will not be singled out for capricious or arbitrary treatment 
in the future. Investors may still have to worry about the rate of a general and 
uniform tariff being raised or lowered, but that is a different thing from a sud- 
den withdrawal of protection from their product (and perhaps a few more) or 
a sudden increase in the tariffs they (and perhaps a few others) have to pay on 
inputs. The generality and uniformity of the tariff by themselves convey (so 
long as they are expected to continue) vast amounts of information and vast 
amounts of reassurance to economic agents. The risks that a 20% rate will 
move to 50%  or to zero can be quite large when each tariff is treated separately; 
these same risks are virtually  nil if they refer  to moving  the entire uniform 
structure up to a general rate of 50% or down to a general rate of zero. Eco- 
nal evidence from Argentina in the  1950s suggests no dramatic distributional shift, and (3) even 
simulations based on extreme assumptions of distributional changes result in revenue reductions 
that are tiny in comparison with the four-ninths factor that we calculated. 295  Tax Lore for Budding Reformers 
nomic agents can move with more assurance, and can think in terms of longer 
horizons, when all they have to worry about are up and down movements of 
the general tariff, than when  they can be placed in difficulty by all sorts of 
specific moves concerning their own products and their own inputs, or con- 
cerning the products of actual and potential rivals. 
So uniformity of tariff rates ends up (compared with typical prereform tariff 
structures and with most others) by promoting a greater sense of fairness on 
the part of taxpayers, making tariff administration easier, making corruption 
much  more difficult, providing an unequivocal  pattern  of uniform effective 
protection to import-competing activities, and giving clearer, potentially more 
reliable signals to investors (of real resources) and other economic agents. By 
the nature of the case, uniformity  encompasses the whole range of  different 
rates,  so assertions of  superiority (to preexisting tariff  structures) should be 
conditioned on the average rate being at worst the same as, and hopefully sig- 
nificantly lower than, the preexisting average. And, of course, the fact remains 
that world welfare can generally be enhanced by lowering a uniform tariff rate 
all the way to zero.2 
9.4  Radial Reductions versus the Accordion Principle versus 
Sectoral Sequencing in Trade Liberalization Programs 
Having proposed uniformity of rates as a plausible and worthy goal of tariff 
reform, I think it reasonable to insert at this point a discussion of a technical 
point  that  is not  widely  appreciated.  Consider  a developing country  that  is 
about to embark on a major program of trade liberalization. Suppose, for sim- 
2. Textbooks treat the cases of “optimum” tariffs and export taxes, often in the context of models 
with one import and one export good. This turns these optimum taxes into general import tariffs 
and general export taxes, practically by definition. The right way  to apply the theory of optimum 
trade taxes is to recognize that optimum import tariffs are justified solely to the degree they help 
exploit a national monopsony position, vis-h-vis the rest of the world, while optimum export taxes 
are justified solely to the degree they help exploit a national monopoly position. I am prepared to 
concede that some countries have artificially restricted exports of particular goods so as to exploit 
actual and imagined monopoly positions. But I know of no country that has employed tariffs for 
the principal purpose of exploiting a monopsony position. Few trading entities possess enough 
market power on the buying side to be able to act as monopsonists. And those who do (like the 
United States and the European Economic Community [EEC]) never use trade policy with the 
aim of exploiting monopsony power. If they did, these economic giants would have high tariffs on 
copper, lead, zinc, tin, and other metals; and on bananas, coffee, tea, and other food items with 
rather inelastic total world supply, in which they account for enough of world demand so that their 
tariffs would significantly lower the world prices of the items in question. It is my contention that 
the United States and the EEC have never adopted tariffs for the purpose of pushing down world 
prices. They have, in a few cases, imposed trade restrictions having this effect, but in these cases 
(sugar in the United States, wheat and meat in the EEC are examples), the motive was patently an 
old-fashioned protectionist one, not a technocratic exploitation of monopsony power. Given their 
admirable self-restraint in this regard it is reasonable for economists to ignore monopsonistic mo- 
tives where the economic giants are concerned. With respect to smaller countries, the facts them- 
selves proclaim the absence of monopsony power. 296  Arnold C. Harberger 
plicity, that its end objective is a uniform 20% tariff on all imports. How should 
it proceed? Most analysts and observers agree that a useful starting point is (1) 
to convert quotas, licensing schemes, and other quantitative restrictions into 
their rough “tariff equivalents”; and (2) to take the “water” out of tariffs that 
are at present prohibitive (i.e., bring them close to the point where trade in fact 
would occur). It is from here on that schemes differ. 
Those whose instincts and training lead them to think in terms of industrial 
groupings are likely to think of a priority ordering in those terms, liberalizing 
imports first in one group, then another, then another. Those who in observing 
actual tariff structures have tended to focus most strongly on the highest rates 
tend to gravitate to the “accordion principle.” This principle squeezes the rate 
structure from above, first reducing, say, to 100% all rates above that figure, 
then moving the top rate from 100% to 80%, then moving it from 80% to 60%, 
and so on, until the target level has been reached. (This principle may run into 
a sort of logical box when the target level is other than zero, but let me simply 
append to it the notion that, while the maximum rate goes 100% to 80%, the 
minimum goes from 0% to 5%, that at the next step the minimum moves up to 
lo%, then to 15%, and finally, say, to 20%.) 
The third candidate for our scrutiny is the principle of radial reductions. This 
works as follows. Let the target tariff in item i be 7,’.  We start out with a vector 
of actual tariffs T?,  T:,  and so forth, which we intend by the end of the process 
to bring to the levels T;,  T;, and so forth. The principle of radial reductions 
simply says that at each step we close each gap (7: -  7:) by a given percentage. 
Thus at every step of the tariff  adjustment, every single tariff moves in the 
correct direction by a specified fraction of the gap (7: -  T,*).  If we are headed 
for an across-the-board tariff of 20% in four equal steps, then the 100% tariff 
goes 100, 80,60,40, 20; the 40% tariff goes 40, 35, 30,25,20; the 12% tariff 
goes 12, 14, 16, 18, 20; and the 0% tariff goes 0,5, 10, 15, 20. 
The radial reduction method is to be preferred because it never consciously 
sends a wrong-direction signal to any activity or sector. The other two methods 
unfortunately have such perverse signalling built  in. The problem  is that at 
every step in the process the price signals go in the wrong direction for “most” 
of the activities in question. This is easiest to show with sectoral sequencing. 
If we are moving in four steps, we will presumably have four “sectors.” When 
we liberalize imports in sector A, resources are being expelled from that sector. 
But liberalization in A causes the real exchange rate (defined as the real price 
of foreign currency, e.g., the real peso price of the dollar) to rise. This partially 
offsets the effect of tariff reductions on the activities included in A, but it gives 
an unequivocal signal to draw resources into the activities of sectors B, C, and 
D. Unfortunately, the likely end result of all the steps will be to expel resources 
from all four protected sectors. If this is the case, then each of the four will be 
given the “right” signal at only one of the steps-that  step in which its particu- 
lar tariffs are being adjusted, In all the other steps, it will be given the “wrong” 297  Tax Lore for Budding Reformers 
signals, stemming from the real exchange rate effects of  the liberalizations 
taking place in the other sectors.) 
Under the accordion principle, the effects are essentially the same. To make 
the exposition easy, let me suppose that all imports are initially subject to tar- 
iffs, and that the tariffs lie in the four bands: (I) 80% to loo%, (2) 60% to 
80%, (3)  40% to 60%, and (4) 20% to 40%. It is easy to see that when all tariffs 
in band 1 are lowered to 80%, imports in categories 2-4  receive (through the 
real exchange rate effect of the tariff reduction in  1) a perverse price signal. 
Similarly when at the second step all tariffs in 1 and 2 are lowered to 60%,  all 
imports in categories 3 and 4 receive perverse price signals. And finally, when 
all tariffs in 1-3  are lowered to 40%, activities in category 4 receive yet another 
perverse signal. 
Why  should we  choose liberalization schemes that have  the  attribute of 
sending conflicting price signals to all or nearly all activities as the liberaliza- 
tion process passes from stage to stage? In particular, why should we  do so 
when it is so easy to avoid sending conflicting signals? The obvious answer is 
simply to choose the radial reduction method of achieving the liberalization 
targets. This approach guarantees that each activity will receive a signal in the 
correct direction at each step of the liberalization process. This will be true for 
activities that in the end will be called upon to release resources, and also for 
activities that in the end will be called upon to increase their level of resource 
use. It will hold for normal cases and for anomalous ones, too. 
Obviously, there are political pressures and debts, marriages of convenience, 
sacred cows, and taboos within most real-world settings in which liberalization 
actually occurs, and real-world governments must make their own judgments 
as to how genuine and how forceful are these considerations in any given set- 
ting. My position is as follows. Most governments will cede something to the 
above considerations, but those considerations should influence economists 
only after they bring to the bargaining table the most sensible, most natural 
solution that economics has to offer. So far as I can see, the principle of radial 
reduction wins hands down over its two principal rivals and should be the “pre- 
scription of  choice” for economists as they are called upon for advice and 
counsel on liberalization programs. 
9.5  On Setting the “Boundaries” of Tax and Other Policies 
One of the most tricky aspects of economic policy making is the setting of 
the “boundaries” to be covered by a given policy. If we are to stimulate small 
3. Real life is usually more complicated than simple examples, so let me mention a couple of 
complications, neither of which affects the essential point being made. In the first place, within 
any of  the sectors there may be activities whose tariffs are being raised (i.e., for which T~*  >  T:). 
Such sectors will get signals in the correct direction at each of the four steps, assuming the net 
effect of each step is an increase in imports. Second, there exist anomalous or perverse cases in 298  Arnold C. Harberger 
businesses, how do we define “small”? If  in a developing country we are to 
favor nontraditional  exports, how do we draw that line? If  we have a value- 
added tax (VAT) that purports to be more or less general, how should we set 
the limits to its coverage? 
For all of these decisions and a myriad of others, technical economic analy- 
sis has a lot to contribute, but so do considerations of administrative costs, of 
fairness, of  controlling corruption and evasion, and so 
This section really has two purposes. The first is to assert that almost never 
is an “industry” as we know it a sensible criterion on which to define the limits 
of  a law. The exceptions of this statement are clear: pure food and drug legis- 
ation  naturally  encompasses the pharmaceutical  and food-producing  indus- 
tries. Safety on railroads,  buses,  and airlines  is appropriately  dealt with by 
legislation specifically oriented to these activities. Protecting the public against 
irresponsible  (as well as fraudulent)  behavior by banks  and insurance  com- 
panies motivates legislation focusing on those industries. 
Having said that, I must add that I have never been able to find anybody who 
could give me a single good reason motivating a tax (or subsidy) on the activi- 
ties or products of the textile industry (which covers canvas tents, denim jeans, 
lace panties, nurses’ uniforms, and designer clothes, among many others) or 
of the shoe industry (which covers a range from baby booties to hunting boots 
to evening slippers), or of  the electrical  generating  industry  (whose alleged 
externalities are like mirages in the desert; they vanish before one gets close 
enough to touch them). 
In this vein, it is easy for me to motivate a tax on noxious emissions, regard- 
less of their source, and then end up exempting some sources because it would 
be too costly to try to administer a tax striking them. Likewise, it is easy to 
motivate a general VAT  and then end up accepting one of less than full general- 
ity for a variety of administrative and pragmatic reasons. But it is very difficult 
which a rise in the real exchange rate leads to an  increase in imports of  certain goods. Suppose 
woolen suits are both imported and made at home; assume, too, that the wool used in the domesti- 
cally made suits is also imported, and that this is the principal purpose for which imported wool 
is used. Now  let the real exchange rate rise. Less suits are imported and more made at home; 
because of this, imports of wool for use in making suits will also increase. 
4.  Note that these additional goals are quite different from “political pressures and debts, mar- 
riages of convenience, sacred cows, and taboos,” precisely because they can claim a certain gener- 
ality across time and space, and a purpose of sufficient merit to justify their inclusion in our profes- 
sional literature and curricula. I for one find it absurd to think of teaching young economists how 
to help Ferdinand Marcos raid the Philippine treasury, or to aid Anastasio Somoza as he used 
economic policy to distribute largesse to his friends. By the same token, but to a lesser degree, I 
do not feel we are at the stage where it is appropriate to teach in economics courses, or to debate 
in our literature, how we can join with a political candidate as he makes rash promises during a 
campaign, or with an incumbent as he rewards his friends and neglects (if he does not outright 
punish) his enemies.  I am old-fashioned enough to feel that what we should write about, and teach 
students about, is how  to assess, measure, and articulate the economic costs that such actions 
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to find reasons for taxation that lead to tax boundaries that are coterminous 
with those of one or of a few standard industrial classifications. 
A good rule to follow is that, where public safety or the protection of  the 
public is concerned, it is reasonable to key in those motives in defining the 
boundaries of legislation. Where externalities are thought to exist, it is reason- 
able to try to measure or approximate those externalities and to implement 
legislation that seeks to recognize and reflect the relevant magnitudes (e.g., 
pollution). Where subsidies or tax incentives are justified in terms of externali- 
ties that are deemed to promote economic development, it is particularly im- 
portant to try to pinpoint the assets or activities involved. I have never seen an 
argument that would justify subsidizing, say, the purchase or rental of buildings 
or  vehicles  on  grounds of  some  supposed externality  in,  say,  the  drug  or 
computer-chip industry. It behooves those who propose subsidies of this kind 
to demonstrate carefully and convincing the approximate size and approximate 
location of the externalities in question. In brief, an “industry” label is no better 
at defining the appropriate boundaries of a subsidy or incentive scheme based 
on externalities than it is for most other policy purposes. 
What is involved in the tax area is, quite generally, the weighing of the goal 
of efficiency against other objectives with some reasonable claim to legitimacy. 
For example, a VAT  at a uniform rate will rarely be progressive, in the sense 
of  falling with a higher average rate on the more well-to-do. A VAT  can be 
made somewhat progressive, however, by applying higher rates to certain com- 
modities bought principally by middle- and upper-income groups. Here one 
faces a very interesting and challenging problem-of  creating, say, three large 
composite goods, A, B, and C, where A represents basic commodities taxed at 
the rate of lo%, and C represents “luxury” goods taxed at 30%, while B con- 
tains the rest of  eligible commodities and is taxed at 20%. Ideally we would 
like these three composite goods to have relatively low elasticities of demand, 
so as to keep the corresponding triangles of  efficiency cost relatively small. 
But it would be absurd to approach this problem with only that aim in view, 
because it would dictate lumping together, say, all refrigerators,  all automo- 
biles, all jewelry into category C, and all clothing and food into category A, so 
as to minimize intragroup substitution. A more suitable grouping, given the 
objective at hand, would be to put expensive cars, refrigerators, TV sets, suits, 
dresses, jewelry, and restaurant meals into category C, and to put cheap items 
of the same types of goods in category A, with the rest going into category B. 
The trick is to try to see to it that most of the relevant substitutes for items in 
each group are also in the same group, and that between-group substitution 
mainly takes place between neighboring groups. 
The result of this process does not mathematically minimize efficiency cost, 
but certainly gives important weight to efficiency as an objective, while striv- 
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9.6  Arguments against Ramsey Taxation 
There has been an enormous revival  in the last two decades of  interest in 
Frank Ramsey’s famous problem: minimizing the efficiency cost of raising a 
given amount of revenue via proportional excise taxes on a subset of, say, k out 
of a total number n of goods and services. In the field of tax analysis the Ram- 
sey problem is something of a bombshell because it decisively demolishes any 
claim that a uniform tax on the k commodities in the subset is likely to be the 
efficiency-cost-minimizing solution. 
If we assume a reduced form system, with taxes T as policy variables and 
equilibrium quantities being X, we can describe the system as 
(1) 
The welfare or efficiency cost of the system of taxes can be written as 
Xt=Xp+gR,JT  (’j=  1,2  ,...,  n). 
J=l 
where AX, is equal to (X, -  Xp). This assumes the reaction coefficients R,, are 
constant over the relevant range. The Ramsey problem can be stated as 
(3) 
1 
Minimize  [ --c&TT], 
2l J 
k 
subject to  C T,X, =  a constant, and with T, = 0 for i > k. This works out 
i-  I 
as follows: 
(4) 
Here the ? denote the efficiency-cost-minimizing  values of  T,. From (5)  we 
get, using the symmetry property RIJ  = RJ,, 
(6)  AX,  =-(1  + A) D,,t; 
XI  =-AX,  (1 + A)/A. 
J 
In general, the Ramsey result is 
(7)  AX,JXt = -p  for  i = 1,  2,.  . . ,  k. 
If the system is linear in the relevant range, the criterion for minimum effi- 
ciency cost is that the quantities of all goods and services in the taxed subset 
(7, = 1, 2,  . . . ,  k)  should all shrink by the same proportion. If the goods in the 
subset are neither substitutes or complements to each other (in the general- 301  Tax  Lore for Budding Reformers 
equilibrium sense), so that R,, = 0 for i andj  within the subset, then we have 
the familiar textbook result that efficiency-cost minimization is achieved when 
the taxes on goods 1 through k are set at rates that are inversely proportional 
to their elasticities of response R,,/X,. This is not the Ramsey solution in the 
general linear case, however. For that case, the best summary characterization 
is the one already given-that  the quantities of all goods and services in the 
subset should shrink by the same amount. 
I have always been troubled by this attribute of the Ramsey solution. Obvi- 
ously, I  am not  implying that it might be wrong  in an analytical  sense, but 
rather that it could be troubling to those who would thrust it upon a society on 
the grounds that it was the best achievable result. 
I feel that the most decisive revelation concerning the Ramsey solution is 
that it puts the state in the role of a sort of discriminating monopolist vis-a-vis 
its own citizens. This can be seen by recognizing that the problem of minimiz- 
ing the efficiency cost of raising a given amount of revenue from goods 1, 2, 
. . . ,  k is essentially the same as the problem of maximizing the revenue that 
can be raised from this subset of goods, while limiting the efficiency cost to a 
given amount. Obviously  a different vector of taxes will be associated  with 
each given amount of efficiency cost. But each of these tax vectors will have 
the characteristic that (for the range in which the R,, are constant) the resulting 
reduction of the equilibrium quantities of the affected X,  will all be the same. 
Now we already know that for the case of linear demand curves, constant 
costs,  and independent markets,  a  discriminating  monopolist  will  find  his 
profit-maximizing  equilibrium at the point  where  the quantity  in each such 
market is just half the undistorted equilibrium quantity. The monopoly markup 
will be greater in the markets with more inelastic demand, and lower in those 
with more elastic demand. Indeed, the markup will end up being inversely 
proportional to the elasticity of demand in each such market-exactly  the re- 
sult for the tax rates in the corresponding Ramsey problem. 
To see the relationship most clearly, consider the fact that the discriminating 
monopolist does not care (presumably)  about the efficiency cost that he im- 
poses. Thus, his  solution  is the unconstrained  revenue  maximum.  It is one 
member of the family of solutions to the problem of maximizing revenue from 
a subset of goods, but subject to an efficiency cost constraint. 
The final answer to the relationship between the Ramsey tax  solution and 
the discriminating  monopoly  solution is as follows (for the linear case): the 
two solutions are identical in the case where the government is asked to raise 
(from goods 1 through k)  the maximum maximorum of revenue. Where the 
government is asked to keep efficiency cost below a target level that is less 
than the one corresponding to the maximum maximorum of revenue, then the 
government gets less revenue than the discriminating monopolist would. Cor- 
respondingly,  instead of shrinking all affected quantities  (X,,  X,,  . . . ,  X,)  by 
one half, the government shrinks them by some smaller uniform fraction. It 
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tion of its monopoly power. The fraction is, however, the same for all affected 
markets. As the efficiency cost constraint facing the government is loosened, 
the Ramsey solution moves pari passu in all affected commodities toward the 
discriminating monopoly solution. 
In my view, this connection helps take some of the magic, some of the attrac- 
tiveness, out of the Ramsey solution. It is quite fair to ask whether governments 
(or “societies”) would or should feel at ease in so ordering their taxes as in 
effect to “exploit” the tastes (or supply constraints) of their citizens. The in- 
equality of rates that emerges from the Ramsey problem turns out to derive 
precisely from such exploitation. When I ask, “Is this what we want?’  I am 
not trying to demean the quest for lower efficiency costs. But at least in my 
view, the  link to monopolistic exploitation takes some of  the sheen off the 
Ramsey  solution and once again (by indirection) brings us back to issues of 
fairness and nondiscrimination. 
9.7  Ramsey Analysis Does Not “Justify” a System of Progressive 
Commodity Taxes 
Writing this section is a somewhat delicate task for me, since it is so easy to 
be misunderstood. Let me begin by setting out three beliefs that I have held for 
a long time: (1) a very strong case can be made for value-added taxation over 
a broad base at a uniform rate; (2)  if we deviate from uniformity, we should 
not do so just to add a last touch of polish or elegance to the tax system, but 
only to fulfill a serious “need’ for nonuniformity in order to reflect the particu- 
lar society’s own sense of values or of fairness; and (3) one pattern of deviation 
that in some cases will meet the criterion set out in  2  is indeed the sort of 
moderately progressive tax system discussed in section 9.5. 
So I come here not as an advocate, peremptorily arguing against the idea of 
a progressive  system of indirect taxes, but rather as a teacher, pleading with 
my readers not to try to defend such a system with the wrong line of argument. 
That is what I feel has been widely done; even more, it is a conclusion to 
which economists might quite naturally jump, after a moderate exposure to the 
idea of Ramsey taxation. Let me take you down what I see as the primrose 
path that leads to error, and then identify the source of the error. The starting 
point is the vision of a completely general tax that in principle would have zero 
efficiency costs. A very simple model reflecting this vision would have labor 
as the only factor of  production, and would go on to postulate a zero-elastic 
supply of labor.5 
5. Such a model is not in principle as far from reality as it may at first look. If the scheme used 
to implement the resulting tax or taxes is a VAT system, one can design the scheme so as effectively 
to exempt the capital factor from taxation. This can be done by employing a VAT of consumption 
type, which can be accomplished most easily through the credit method of  administration. Under 
this method each firm  pays tax (at the requisite rate or rates) on its total sales, then deducts the 
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In such a system there are two equivalent taxes that are completely neutral 
(i.e., have zero efficiency cost). One is a flat-rate tax on all labor (which strikes 
the income of people as they earn it), the other a flat-rate tax on all purchases 
of consumption goods and services (which strikes the income of people as they 
spend it). The latter tax can be implemented via a VAT  of the consumption 
type. 
Now we modify the original problem by releasing the assumption of zero- 
elastic labor supply. Our uniform tax now covers only n - 1 goods and ser- 
vices, the nrh  (and untaxed) one being leisure. We also know that this uniform 
tax will not typically be neutral, since it distorts the choice between labor and 
leisure and, more generally, the choices between leisure on the one hand and 
each of the remaining n -  1 goods and services on the other. 
If  we are precluded from taxing leisure, the Ramsey solution (for a linear 
system) entails imposing a set of pi  such that the quantities of the n -  1 goods 
and services other than leisure all contract by the same proportion. This entails 
placing higher taxes on goods that are complementary to leisure, or that are 
less-than-average substitutes for leisure, and placing lower taxes on those that 
are better-than-average substitutes for leisure. 
This result can be seen intuitively. Suppose there existed one good, say X,, 
which was used only in fixed proportions with leisure. Then the fact that we 
are precluded from taxing leisure would be no constraint at all. The pair of 
goods (X, and leisure) would be like left and right shoes, and we could work 
on the principle that a tax of $2 per pair of shoes can be replicated either by a 
tax of  $2 per right shoe or by a tax of $2 per left shoe. Applied to our case, 
leisure would be like the right shoe, X, like the left one. We know that a uni- 
form tax on all goods including leisure would be neutral. We hypothetically 
create such a tax, but then, being precluded from directly taxing leisure, we 
load the total tax on the pair (X, plus X,) onto X, alone. Because of the rigidity 
of proportions between X, and X,,, this modified tax system is equivalent to the 
uniform one, and hence is also neutral. 
If  we can’t  find a target with completely fixed proportions to leisure, then 
things with close-to-fixed proportions can serve as surrogates.  The Ramsey 
for capital as well as current outlays, so that no distinction need be made between the two; for this 
reason it is easier to administer than a VAT of the income type (in which capital assets purchases 
are not immediately deductible but must be capitalized and then depreciated over time, for tax 
purposes) or one of the product type (in which capital assets are neither expensed nor depreciated, 
but in which they nonetheless must be distinguished from current inputs, which are expensed). 
When capital assets are expensed (as occurs with the consumption type of tax), one can say that 
the capital factor is thus freed of tax. This is self-evident for a constant rate (t) of VAT,  The firm 
pays t on the service yield (S)  of capital assets as it accrues over time, but pays -ton  the acquisition 
cost (C). Considering that at the firm’s own rate of discount the present value of the service yield 
(PVS) will tend to equal the present value of acquisition cost (PVC), it becomes clear that no net 
tax payment is involved. The government in effect “invests” tC and takes a return of  rS; it thus 
ends up as a r% partner in each capital asset so treated, rather than as a taxing agent. 304  Arnold C. Harberger 
solution says that goods whose quantities increase least when the price of lei- 
sure rises should be taxed at the highest rates, and vice versa. This is the source 
of the notion that the Ramsey solution tells us to tax more heavily those goods 
that are complements to, or less-than-average substitutes for, leisure. 
So far we have traveled a considerable distance without getting into trouble. 
The trouble appears right at this point, as we face the question of which goods 
are complementary to leisure, which are good substitutes, and which are poor 
substitutes. For something close to twenty years now, I have performed an ex- 
periment  with my public  finance classes  and with occasional  seminar audi- 
ences. Let us make a list, I suggest, of  goods that are complements to leisure, 
and  I  then  receive  suggestions  from the  floor.  “Television  sets,”  says one. 
“Movies,”  says another. “Vacation  trips,”  says a third. Then comes a whole 
barrage:  sporting  goods,  restaurant  meals,  concerts,  night  clubs,  summer 
houses, leisure-time clothes, and so forth. 
When the list gets long enough, I tell my students that they really should do 
better than that-they  are not really thinking like economists. To think like an 
economist about this problem one should pose a scenario that will automati- 
cally reveal the answer. 
I have two such scenarios. They both  start with a full equilibrium, where 
everybody is working his or her desired number of hours at the going wage. In 
the first scenario, this equilibrium is disturbed by a government decree, requir- 
ing each of them to work one or two hours less, at the same wage as before. 
This move entails  no  first-order income effect. Each person has less money 
income, counterbalanced by more leisure. Their money income may go down 
from $500 to $475, and we have to ask, which goods will see an increase in 
demand (these will be complements to leisure), which goods will see a small 
decrease (these will be poor substitutes), and which goods will see a big de- 
crease (these will be good substitutes for leisure). 
The best course at this point is to follow the advice of the Austrian school, 
and simply look inside ourselves for the answer (introspection,  they call it). 
My answer is that if  I were faced with such an arbitrary cut in my working 
hours and in my money income, I would react much the same as if I had the 
same cut in income (say from an increase in taxes), without the drop in working 
hours. The result is not exactly the same because the “time constraint” behaves 
differently  in the two cases. But I  certainly  would allow my behavior to be 
guided more by a 5% cut in money income than by two extra hours of leisure. 
Following this line of reasoning I  conclude that the cross-elasticities  of de- 
mand for different goods and services with respect to changes in the price of 
leisure (qJ are not exactly proportional  but are close to proportional  to the 
income elasticities of demand (a,)  of those items. Exact proportionality  pre- 
vails if people pay no attention at all to the change in the time constraint. 
Once this example has been presented,  my audiences over the years have 
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to be the  inferior goods (those with u, < 0), that the  strong substitutes for 
leisure are strong luxury goods (those with u, > l),  and that the weak substi- 
tutes for leisure are probably “ordinary necessities” (with 1 > u, > 0). These 
audiences  have  certainly  recognized  the  absurdity  of  their  original  line  of 
thinking about the problem, which departs from the premise that anything you 
use in your leisure time is a complement to leisure. That premise, taken seri- 
ously, leads to the conclusion that everything is a complement to leisure except 
for overalls and lunch pails (the things you actually use while at work). 
The second scenario leads to the same conclusion. In that scenario every- 
body starts in equilibrium at the prevailing wage, and is now offered the oppor- 
tunity to work overtime at a premium wage. Everybody will respond by work- 
ing more (or at worst the same), because, once again, no first-order income 
effect is involved. Do you think they will takefewer  vacation trips, go tofewer 
movies, buy fewer restaurant meals, own fewer summer houses, and so forth, 
as a consequence of working a few more hours at overtime rates? Much more 
plausible is the result that they spend the extra income in much the same way 
as they  would  spend the proceeds  of  a reduction  in taxes or of  an  annuity 
received as an inheritance. 
One final shot on the point being made here.  I am asserting that the q,, 
(cross-elasticities of demand for goods with respect to the price of leisure) are 
approximately proportional to the u, (income elasticities of  demand for the 
respective goods), My parting shot is that we had better all hope it is that way, 
because the things we measure and label as income elasticities are in reality 
complex jumbles in which the u, and the q,,  are inextricably mixed. Consider 
a typical time series demand analysis. Most of the changes in real income re- 
corded over, say, a twenty- or thirty-year period will stem from changes in real 
wages; another part will come from changes in income from capital. Well, the 
part coming from wage rate changes affects consumption of good i by both an 
income effect (u,)  and a substitution effect (qJ with respect to the price of 
leisure. Only the part coming from changes in capital income gives us a pure 
income effect. 
Consider now a typical  cross-section analysis of  demand. Once again the 
main differences in income among the people (or households) represented in 
the  analysis are likely  to stem from differences  in their hourly  wage rates. 
Once again the response of  demand for good  i with respect to these income 
differences incorporates effects from both u, and qtn.  Only the response  of 
demand to differences in the capital income of the different households reflects 
a pure income effect. 
So, if  we want to really measure income elasticity of  different goods and 
services,  we have to treat as separate variables  in our demand functions the 
real income stemming from labor on the one hand and the real income stem- 
ming from nonlabor income in the other. Only the coefficient of the latter gives 
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cannot distinguish very clearly between the ways small increments of the two 
types of  income (starting from a given base) would be  spent, then the data 
would be corroborating the point that I am making here. 
The end of this long lesson is that the Ramsey analysis would lead us to tax 
most highly the inferior goods, next most highly the ordinary necessities, and 
least highly of all, the luxuries. As I survey my students and colleagues, look- 
ing for supporters of this package as serious, real-world  legislation, I find an 
empty set. Moral of the story: please do not propose a progressive structure of 
excise taxes, and invoke the Ramsey rule as your reason! 
9.8  More on Drawing Boundaries and on Evasion 
The theme of this section is welfare triangles. The general-equilibrium ver- 
sion of the textbook triangle (- lRT,AY,) is the “generalized triangle” -  112  x,  TAX,,  where  AX,  is  measured  from  the  undistorted  equilibrium 
(q,  g,  . . . ,  q)  to the full equilibrium  (X,)  with all the T in place. As indi- 
cated in section 9.5, the trick in setting boundaries is to put close substitutes 
together within a classification, so as to tax them all at a single rate. By treating 
packages of close  substitutes as composite  commodities,  we eliminate tax- 
induced  substitution  among  them; that  is,  we  eliminate  what  we  can  call 
within-group substitution. What we are left with, if we have several different 
groupings of commodities, is between-group substitution. 
Consider that we have a tax T3 on four-door sedans, X, only. The welfare 
triangle -  1/2T3U3  will have an enormous base, compared with what is feasi- 
ble through good boundary drawing. The base AY,  would include substitution 
between four-door sedans and two-door sedans, between four-door sedans and 
coupes, convertibles,  station wagons,  and so forth, as well as between four- 
door sedans and motorcycles, between four-door sedans and panel trucks, be- 
tween four-door sedans and other trucks, and finally between four-door sedans 
and everything else. 
The tax T3  thus defined qualifies soundly as an utterly stupid tax. It is slightly 
improved by setting T, on two-door sedans at the same rate, and putting T5,  T,, 
and T, on coupes, convertibles, and station wagons, also at the same rate. At 
the end of this process we have a tax  T, on all automobiles, which if  at the 
same rate raises much more money than did T,, and which if set to raise the 
same amount of money as T3 can do so at a much lower efficiency cost (be- 
cause of a greatly lower rate and because the elasticity of demand for automo- 
biles is very much less than for sedans). 
But that is not the whole story by any means. I mentioned panel trucks and 
motorcycles for a reason, for we know from experience that very interesting, 
very curious things can happen to these vehicles if automobiles are very heav- 
ily taxed. I recall  some decades ago when Chile had very heavy taxes (they 
were actually tariffs) on cars, but much lower ones on panel trucks. The result 
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by an entirely new Chilean industry-that  of “converting” panel trucks into 
something that  looked  like and served as a car. The panels  were invariably 
knocked out and replaced by glass windows. Upholstered seats were installed 
in the back. Sometimes new doors were added, sometimes not. 
In the case of motorcycles, my example comes from Indonesia. Again the 
story starts with a heavy tax on imports of cars, with a much lower (maybe 
even zero) tax on motorcycles. But here it was the motorcycles that underwent 
conversion. Three-wheel cycles were converted, by artful additions, into vir- 
tual buses, or at least taxis.  Sometimes a single bench was added, with the 
passenger looking backward. Other times the cycle was stretched at the back, 
with two benches going down each side, and maybe even with an extra little 
running board cutting laterally across the rear (where the rear bumper of  a car 
would  be).  I  must  say  I  was  truly  astounded  when  I  saw  my  first  eight- 
passenger motorcycle, but I came to relish the experience. 
I hope that readers can see the close analogy between these newly spawned 
conversion industries and what we have come to regard as rent-seeking activity. 
The difference between the tax rates on cars and trucks, or  between those on 
cars and motorcycles, generates the use of real resources (I) to take advantage 
of a potential economic rent generated by a misguided law, (2)  to avoid paying 
the tax on cars, and (3) to reflect the same kind of tax-induced substitution that 
always takes place when given items are taxed and actual or potential substi- 
tutes are taxed either at lower rates or not at all. If the above were a multiple- 
choice question, my answer would be “all of the above.” Answers  1, 2, and 3 
are different descriptions of the same phenomenon.  The curious behavior of 
the panel-truck converters in Chile and of the motorcycle converters in Indone- 
sia is in principle just as natural an economic consequence of taxation as it is 
for people to drink more beer when the tax on wine is raised. But surely re- 
sources were in some sense wasted in the process; efficiency costs would be 
dramatically  reduced if  the boundaries  of  the automobile tax  had been  so 
drawn as to include converted panel trucks and converted motorcycles, if not 
all trucks and all motorcycles as well. 
This brings me to the topic of tax evasion. This is just another way in which 
the bases AX, of  the generalized  triangle  -1/2  ci TAX,  end up being made 
bigger.  And  it  is quite analogous  to the  reconversion  activities  referred  to 
above. They would be called tax-evasion activities if they were illegal; as it is 
they can be fairly labeled tax-avoidance activities. But is there any real differ- 
ence between converting a motorcycle into a “taxi” using real resources so as 
to avoid the tax on cars, compared with using real resources to smuggle TV 
sets or whiskey into a country so as to evade its tax on these items? And, going 
one step further, is there any real difference between using real resources to 
smuggle whiskey on the one hand, and using real resources  to hide certain 
receipts from the income tax collector? I for one think that in none of these 
cases is there any real difference. 
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by the existence of the “conversion” activities (whether of  the Chilean or of 
the Indonesian type), so too is the welfare triangle for imported whiskey made 
larger by the fact of smuggling. If in the base of the whiskey triangle we have 
substitution toward gin, toward rum, toward wine, toward beer, and toward all 
other things, we also have to insert substitution away from taxed whiskey and 
toward untaxed (i.e., smuggled) whiskey. AX,, (if that is whiskey) is nor the 
difference between whiskey consumption  in the undistorted equilibrium  and 
whiskey consumption in the presence of the tax. No, it is instead the difference 
between  whiskey  consumption  in  the  undistorted  equilibrium and  “taxed- 
whiskey consumption” in the presence of the tax. 
Out of this comes an insight that I think of as reasonably penetrating: when 
we are analyzing taxes, the definition of a commodity is what the tax law itself, 
plus its administration, determines it to be. Just as the size of the triangle’s 
base can be greatly affected via bad or good drawing of boundaries (i.e., defi- 
nition of what is being taxed), so too it can be greatly affected by the ease of 
administration and by its effectiveness. Ease of administration largely depends 
on how  the law is written; effectiveness  of  administration  depends on how 
much  effort and ingenuity the administrators  put in and, of course, on how 
honest they are. 
One final point: once we recognize that evasion is “just another substitute 
commodity,” we can see that it is absolutely natural and normal that it should 
increase with every notch by  which the tax rate itself is raised. It is just the 
same as people drinking more beer as the tax in whiskey goes from 40% to 
60%, and drinking  still more beer when  it goes from 60% to 80%. At the 
margin, evasion efforts will be pursued until the extra cost of evading the tax 
on another unit of the commodity is itself just equal to the tax rate. 
This helps explain the behavior of  Argentine taxpayers described in section 
9.2-how  with every increase of the tax rate imposed by the authorities there 
was a new burst of additional evasion. That is something that is perfectly natu- 
ral, perfectly predictable, perfectly understandable in economic terms. 
How then can tax authorities cope with this type of  natural phenomenon? I 
think the answer is overkill. If the penalties for evasion are high enough, most 
people will be “honest” even if the tax does go up from 40% to 60% to 80%. 
By raising the costs of evasion high enough, we may be able to drive people 
into that corner solution called “honesty.”  This is an important and serious 
message, and one that lies at the heart of needed tax and administrative reforms 
in many developing countries. 
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